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This paper uses agglomeration theory to analyze the impact of Thai government policies on 
the development of the Thai automotive industry and cluster formation in Central and 
Eastern Thailand. Using cross-section data on 162 auto-parts suppliers from the Thailand 
Automotive Directory 2003-2004, the paper examines the criteria of supplier selection in the 
Thai automotive industry. Using logit models and cross-section data on 162 auto-parts 
suppliers from the Thailand Automotive Directory 2003-2004, the paper examines the effects 
of economies of scale, technology, distance between suppliers and assembler plants, and 
nationality on the likelihood of a supplier being selected as a subcontractor. Furthermore, the 
paper compares the role of these factors for different types of assemblers – Japanese and 
American, automobile and motorcycle. The findings suggest that scale of production is a 
dominant factor while there is no significant preference for suppliers of the same nationality 
as the assembler. In addition, assemblers are more likely to choose parts makers located in 
close proximity as their subcontractors, as the agglomeration theory predicts. Finally, the 
comparison of supplier selection criteria for different types of assemblers shows that there 
exists commonalities in valuing economies of scale while the automobile assemblers is the 
group that mostly concern technological level of suppliers. 
 1. Introduction 
 
The economic significance of the automobile industry lies both in its scale and the 
complexity of its direct and indirect links with many other industries. For this reason, the 
sector has received considerable attention, both by policy makers and by researchers. One 
area of particular focus is the local subcontracting arrangements of vehicle manufacturers 
because of the vertical spillovers these generate. In addition, an abundance of previous studies 
has paid significant attention to the effect of geographical economies and/or agglomeration 
economies on the supplier selection decision. Marukawa (2003), for example, has examined 
the criteria of supplier selection and trends in component outsourcing within and across 
regions in China, while Ono (2001) has focused on the relationship between local market size, 
the degree of outsourcing, and the productivity of local firms. Agglomeration economies and 
the location decisions of domestic and foreign auto-parts suppliers are also examined in Klier 
et al. (2004), Nagao (2002), and Muray et al. (1999).   
The automotive industry is also of considerable importance for the Thai economy. 
According to the Thailand Automotive Industry Directory 2003－2004, the automotive 
industry is Thailand’s third largest industry and, directly and indirectly, accounts for more 
than 200,000 jobs. In 2004, Thailand produced more than 900,000 cars and trucks and 
approximately 2.8 million motorcycles. However, there are only a few studies that have 
quantitatively examined the local subcontracting decisions of automobile manufacturers. 
Maruhashi (1995) and Chareonporn (2001), for example, have looked at supplier selection in 
the Thai automotive industry, focusing in particular on the vertical integration decisions of 
assemblers, but their analysis is largely of a qualitative nature. In addition, especially in the 
case of Thailand, there are few studies examining the criteria based on which auto-parts 
  2suppliers are selected. This paper attempts to fill this gap by examining supplier-selection 
criteria quantitatively, focusing in particular on the role of distance between trading partners. 
If we view the Thai automotive industry as a cluster, distance is a crucial variable that may 
help to explain the supplier system in the industry.   
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a historical overview of 
the development of the Thai automotive industry and discusses the effects of government 
policies on the concentration of auto-parts and automobile manufacturers in Central and 
Eastern Thailand by using agglomeration theory. The structure and current situation of the 
Thai automotive industry are outlined in Section 3. Section 4 explains general concepts of 
subcontracting and compares Japanese and Western subcontracting systems in Thailand. 
Section 5 presents the theoretical framework, model and data sources. Using cross-section 
data from 162 auto-parts suppliers, the study employs logit models to examine the role of 
economies of scale, technology, distance, location advantages, and nationality in supplier 
selection. Furthermore, differences in supplier selection criteria between Japanese and 
American assemblers as well as between automobile and motorcycle manufacturers are 
explored. Section 6 then presents the results and their interpretation, while Section 7 offers 
concluding remarks.   
 
 
2. The Thai Automotive Industry 
 
2.1 Development, Structural Changes and Government Policies 
Thailand has become the world’s second largest market for 1 ton pick-up trucks after 
the US and the biggest automobile production base in Southeast Asia. The rapid growth in the 
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the sector. While other countries like China or Malaysia, for example, set up national car 
programs to develop their local industries, the Thai government pursued a different strategy, 
attracting global vehicle assemblers and auto-parts manufacturers to the country. 
Nevertheless, the Thai government enacted several measures to support local manufacturers. 
For example, in 1978, the government limited the number of models and series of vehicles to 
enable auto-parts firms and vehicle manufacturers to attain economies of scale. Another 
crucial factors in encouraging the industry’s growth were protectionist policies such as local 
content requirements (LCRs) and high import tariff rates.   
Local content requirements and high tariff rates helped develop the Thai automotive 
industry mainly in two ways. First, the policies led to the widespread use of subcontracting, 
which benefited the local auto-parts industry. Second, production and management know-how 
and technologies were transferred to local firms as a result of multinational firms’ attempts to 
upgrade the quality of local suppliers and to conform to local content requirements (Busser, 
1999; Yamashita, 2004).   
The structure of the auto-parts suppliers in the industry was also affected by 
government policies. The improvement in the quality of labor and production resulting from 
technology transfer played an important part in expanding the number of original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs). According to Doner (1991), the number of OEMs in Thailand 
producing sophisticated auto-parts increased dramatically from less than 30 during the period 
1962-1975 to 150 firms by the mid-1980s. It is assumed that the surge in the number of OEMs 
was brought about by the advances in OEMs technological capabilities and the expansion in 
the demand for OEM parts more generally as the Thai automobile industry grew. 
  Production, sales and exports trends for Thailand’s automotive industry as well as 
  4the timing of important policy measures are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
2.2 Cluster Formation 
Government policies not only influenced the structure of the auto-parts industry, but 
also the location choices of automobile assemblers and parts suppliers. The spatial 
concentration of the Thai automotive industry in Central and Eastern Thailand, for example, 
has been shaped by government initiatives such as the establishment of industrial estates and 
the Board of Investment (BOI)’s incentive systems. According to a study on 709 first-tier 
suppliers by the Thai Automotive Institute (TAI) (2002), first-tier suppliers are most heavily 
concentrated in Bangkok, which accounts for 33 percent of the total. Samut Prakan, Chon 
Buri and Rayong have the second, third, and fourth highest concentration of suppliers, 
accounting for 22 percent, 7 percent, and 6 percent, respectively. Although there are no 
reliable studies of second- and lower-tier suppliers, TAI (2002) reckons that second- and 
lower-tier suppliers were also largely concentrated in Bangkok and Samut Prakan Provinces. 
The location distribution of assembly plants and first-tier auto-parts suppliers is shown in 
Figures 2 and 3.   
 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 
 
Reasons for the concentration in Central Thailand are the well-established 
infrastructures and incentives created by the government. These led the first wave of 
Japanese assemblers in the 1960s to establish their assembly plants in the first industrial 
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their customers and other component firms, auto-parts firms followed suit in establishing 
their plants in Central Thailand to gain access to a larger market and to minimize 
transportation and communication costs.   
The second influx of parts makers into Thailand followed in the latter half of the 
1980s as a result of the appreciation of the yen and expectations of further growth in demand 
(Maruhashi, 1995; Lecler, 2002). In the 1990s, however, assemblers mainly invested in 
Eastern Thailand. For example, Toyota and Isuzu established new factories in Chachoengsao 
Province while Mitsubishi set up in Chon Buri Province, Eastern Thailand, to capture a share 
of the expected growth in domestic demand and respond to the anticipated arrival of Ford, 
General Motors (GM) and BMW. Moreover, Western assemblers, entering at the end of the 
1990s, also established factories in Rayong Province, Eastern Thailand. These assemblers 
were subsequently followed by parts manufacturers, both Japanese and non-Japanese, that 
also set up in Eastern Thailand.   
These developments mean that a new center of auto production has emerged in 
Eastern Thailand – a fact that may be partly explained by government incentives aimed at 
narrowing regional income gaps. Using surveys, Lecler (2002) found that the geographical 
change was mainly the result of the negative effects of overinvestment in the Bangkok area 
and its vicinity, such as traffic congestion, high labor costs and land scarcity. The expansion to 
Eastern Thailand helps investors avoid the high costs that would otherwise be incurred if they 
established a new network in Bangkok. It also provides them with several advantages, such 
as the proximity to port or highway facilities, relatively close vicinity to their head offices in 
the Bangkok area, cheaper wages and land rents than in the Bangkok area, and substantial 
incentives from the BOI. These factors are consistent with agglomeration theory, which will be 
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positive externalities. 
In aggregate, the described developments indicate that auto-parts firms in Thailand 
have tended to locate in the vicinity of an agglomeration of assembly plants and vice versa.   
 
 
3. The Structure and Current Situation of the Thai Automotive Industry 
 
3.1 The Structure of the Thai Auto-Parts Industry 
The Thai automotive industry is composed of fourteen car assemblers, five 
motorcycle assemblers, and 1,709 auto-parts manufacturers, 709 of which are first-tier 
suppliers. According to the Office of Industrial Economics, Ministry of Industry, in 2002, 
Thailand’s car and motorcycle production capacity per year was 1,073,700 and 2,080,000 units, 
respectively. The production capacity of each assembler is shown in Table 1. 
With respect to ownership of first-tier suppliers that supply parts to assemblers 
directly, the following pattern emerges: approximately 50 percent are wholly Thai-owned, 10 
percent are Thai majority-owned and 40 percent are foreign majority-owned. The structure of 
the industry is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Insert Table 1, Figure 4 
 
Major parts that are produced in Thailand include engines, suspension systems, 
brakes, clutches, steering wheel systems, body parts, electronic parts, accessories, tires, 
plastics and glasses, etc. Table 2 divides first-tier auto-parts makers into eight categories 
  7according to the parts they supply. The table indicates that wholly Thai-owned firms account 
for 50 percent of all auto-parts makers. However, it also shows that it is foreign 
majority-owned firms that are the dominant players in each of the major parts categories 
(categories 1-7) except for “body parts,” which do not require a very high level of technology. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
3.2 The Current Situation of the Thai Automobile and Auto-Parts Industry1
3.2.1 Automobiles
Thailand’s automobile industry rapidly recovered from the 1997/98 Asian crisis and 
production has been steadily increasing since 1999. Between 1997 and 2004, production on 
average increased by 81.2 percent a year. Growth continued in the first six months of 2005, 
with production rising by 15.9 percent, sales going up by 15.8 percent, and exports increasing 
by 25.9 percent compared with the corresponding period a year earlier. Automobile production 
in the first half of 2005 amounted to 517,829 units, domestic sales came to 345,897 units, and 
exports reached 191,180 units.   
Thailand’s auto market has been dominated by Japanese brands. Based on domestic 
sales in the first half of 2005, Toyota, the best-selling brand in Thailand, occupied a domestic 
market share of 40.6 percent while Isuzu and Honda had the second and third highest market 
shares, with 25.4 percent and 7.1 percent respectively. The major export destinations for Thai 
automotive production are Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia and Japan. 
Pick-up trucks, which are also the best-selling vehicle type in the domestic market, are the 
major export item, followed by passenger cars.   
                                                  
1 Data referred to in this section are from the Thai Automotive Institute, online: <www. 
thaiauto.or.th> 
  8The trends in the production, sales, and exports of automobiles from 1996 to 2005 are 
shown in Tables 3 to 5. 
 
Insert Tables 3, 4 and 5 
 
3.2.2 Motorcycles 
During the first half of 2005, motorcycle production volume dropped to 1,179,443 units 
from 1,442,133 units during the corresponding period in 2004, representing a decrease of 18.2 
percent (see Table 6). However, motorcycle sales still posted a small increase of 1.2 percent 
from 1,031,577 units to 1,044,247 units in the first six months of 2005. The best-selling 
motorcycle brand in Thailand is Honda. Based on sales in the first half of 2005, Honda 
occupied a market share of 69.6 percent, followed by Yamaha with a market share of 14.2 
percent.  
 
 Insert  Table  6 
 
3.2.3 Auto-Parts 
According to data from the Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce, the 
export value of Thailand’s automobile and motorcycle parts from January to June 2005 totaled 
111,311.8 million baht, an increase of 27.3 percent from the corresponding period in the 
previous year. The major export markets for auto-parts are Japan, the United States, 
Malaysia, South Africa and Indonesia. The most important auto-parts exports items are OEM 
parts (33,695.73 million baht), engines (3,951.53 million baht), and spare parts (1,804.73 
million baht) (see Table 7).   
  9 
Insert Table 7   
 
 
4. Subcontracting Concepts and Patterns 
 
4.1 Types of Subcontracting 
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to analyzing subcontracting systems: the 
first looks at subcontracting arrangements from the point of view of the assembler, examining 
the number of suppliers an assembler uses to procure a certain type of component. The second 
looks at subcontracting arrangements from the point of view of the subcontractor, considering 
the subcontractor’s position in the overall supply system and its number of clients. The 
following subsections look at subcontracting arrangements from both points of view in greater 
detail. 
 
4.1.1 Single and Multiple Sourcing 
Looking first at subcontracting arrangements from the viewpoint of the assembler, two 
types of sourcing strategy can be distinguished. 
The first strategy is single sourcing, where assemblers procure the entire volume of a 
given part from a single supplier. Assemblers generally use this method if they have sufficient 
trust in a supplier to meet necessary quality standard. Such trust is usually built through 
long-term relationships. Apart from trust, another possible reason for relying on single 
sourcing is that a supplier possesses certain patents that make it the only possible source. A 
further possible reason for single sourcing is that the demand for a specific part is too small to 
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advantages, such as volume discounts for large orders or cost savings in managing the 
supplier data base (Bross and Zhao, 2005). At the same time, however, this sourcing strategy 
carries some disadvantages; for example, single sourcing provides suppliers with some 
monopolistic power (Nabeoka, 1996). 
The second strategy is multiple sourcing, where an assembler procures a given part 
from several suppliers. Multiple sourcing, introduced in Thailand in the 1980s (Maruhashi, 
1995), provides several advantages. Competition between suppliers usually brings about 
quality improvements and price reductions. Furthermore, multiple sourcing makes 
assemblers more independent of individual suppliers and allows them to penalize suppliers 
that do not meet required quality standards or fail to deliver on time. Assemblers can, for 
example, penalize suppliers by shifting a fraction of their orders to other suppliers. This 
pressure will force suppliers to improve their performance to meet assemblers’ requirements. 
In addition, parts supplies become more stable due to the availability of several supply 
sources. Lastly, multiple sourcing also provides an opportunity to test potential new suppliers 
with trial orders. 
 
4.1.2 Exclusive and Shared Suppliers 
Turning to subcontracting arrangements from the viewpoint of suppliers, again two 
approaches can be distinguished: exclusive supply arrangements and shared supply 
arrangements. Exclusive suppliers are those who exclusively supply a particular part to an 
assembler whereas shared suppliers supply parts or services to several vehicle 
manufacturers.  
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products and a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis exclusive suppliers. On the other hand, 
using shared suppliers allows assemblers to enjoy lower prices resulting from economies of 
scale suppliers can attain. In addition, a system of shared suppliers also generates positive 
network externalities. Shared suppliers gain access to the technologies and know-how of 
several vehicle manufacturers and are in tune with the needs of a variety of customers. Such 
access helps to improve product quality and ultimately benefits all vehicle manufacturers 
(Nabeoka, 1996). However, using shared suppliers also carries some risks, such as the leakage 
of proprietary knowledge or having little negotiation power over suppliers. 
 
4.2 Japanese and Western Subcontracting Systems 
4.2.1 The Japanese Subcontracting System in Thailand 
The primary features of Japanese vehicle manufacturers’ outsourcing arrangements 
are long-term relationships, QCDEM systems (explained below), and suppliers’ associations. 
 
Long-Term Relationships 
Japanese vehicle manufacturers usually develop long-term relationships with their 
parts suppliers. Long-term relationships allow Japanese assemblers to recognize suppliers’ 
capabilities and technologies through ongoing relational contracting. In addition, such 
relationships provide incentives to suppliers to perform well in order to maintain the 
relationship. Furthermore, suppliers are provided with the necessary certainty to invest in 
research and development as it is unlikely that a contract will be completely terminated once 
a “formal purchase agreement”2 is signed. Put simply, long-term relationships simultaneously 
                                                  
2 According to a survey by Maruhashi (1995), in Toyota’s case, for example, a formal purchase 
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supplier monitoring costs. 
 
QCDEM Criteria 
Japanese assemblers commonly use QCDEM criteria to select auto-parts suppliers and 
to measure supplier performance, where QCDEM stands for Quality, Cost, Delivery, 
Engineering and Management.   
Assemblers place high importance on the quality of components while at the same 
time trying to control their costs. To achieve this, in their dealings with suppliers, assemblers 
set cost reduction schedules in advance and adjust target prices periodically, taking 
innovation and movements in raw material prices into account. This schedule propels 
suppliers to conduct research and work toward innovations to meet the cost target and 
enhance their profitability. Both Japanese and Western assemblers employ cost reduction 
schedules to enhance supplier performance.   
Delivery performance is another important requirement of Japanese vehicles 
manufacturers. To economize on inventory costs, Japanese assemblers rely on lean production 
and just-in-time (JIT) systems which require suppliers to deliver the necessary volume of 
auto-parts at the time they are needed. Consequently, suppliers must provide high delivery 
performance and act as inventory buffers for vehicle manufacturers.   
Lastly, production efficiency, design capabilities, quality control as well as on-time 
delivery are generally determined by engineering and management know-how. Engineering 
capabilities include capabilities in the areas of design and cost reduction thorough Value 
                                                                                                                                                            
agreement is valid until the model is phased out. The usual period for a full model change is 
four years and for a minor model change two years. 
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firms have been transferred from Japanese, American and European firms through licenses or 
technical assistance. Regarding management systems, local suppliers are also accustomed to 
Japanese management systems such as kaizen,  kanban and Total Quality Management 
(TQM). 
According to a survey by the Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers Association (TAPMA) 
(2002), first-tier suppliers in Thailand perform well in the area of quality control. They can 
supply parts with average defect rates of 25-50 parts per million (ppm) which is below the 100 
ppm target rate. Concerning cost reductions, assemblers set targets of 3 to 25 percent for 
OEMs for automobile parts and of 40 percent for motorcycles parts. The relatively high 
reduction rate for motorcycle parts is due to strong international competition and an influx of 
cheap motorcycle parts from China. The replacement market in Thailand also has to contend 
with fierce price competition, especially from Taiwan, China and India. Regarding the 
technological capabilities of Thai suppliers, TAPMA (2002) found that the lack of high-end 
technologies as well as new trends in outsourcing systems, such as global sourcing policies, 
design-in or module sourcing, and shorter life-cycles for parts has relegated Thai suppliers 
from first-tier to second- or lower-tier suppliers. TAPMA (2002) also identified three major 
management problems in small Thai auto-parts firms: the scarcity of skilled workers, low 
management abilities in the area of quality control and working environment, and a lack of 
knowledge about international standards such as ISO 9000/1400/16949. These problems are 
responsible for the fact that Thai auto-parts firms, especially SMEs, have difficulties in 
gaining certification to international quality standards.   
                                                  
3 Value Analysis is used to modify a design to reduce costs in the production stage while Value 
Engineering helps suppliers to attain efficiency in production by reducing costs in design and 
the trial production stage. 
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There are two main objectives underlying the establishment of supplier associations: 
to improve performance and to create strong relationships among suppliers. 
Supplier associations help suppliers to more quickly resolve problems and create an 
environment conducive to innovation. Suppliers can use these associations as a forum for 
consultations to share techniques and know-how. Furthermore, the use of shared technologies 
and management systems facilitates understanding among suppliers and assemblers and 
brings about higher productivity and efficiency in vehicle production (Maruhashi, 1995; 
Charoenporn, 2001). Moreover, assemblers can use the association as a forum to announce 
cost reduction schedules and other basic policies. 
Another purpose of the associations is to help strengthen relationships among 
suppliers. The associations hold annual meetings, golf and bowling tournaments and sport 
days, as well as organize case study activities, lectures, factory visits, and overseas seminars 
to improve suppliers’ skills.4 Apart from uniting and training suppliers, these activities also 
contribute to developing and sustaining long-term relationships between assemblers and 
suppliers. In Thailand, suppliers are allowed to join several supplier associations, providing 
the advantage that suppliers’ know-how can be improved through working with several 
automobile manufacturers. 
In contrast with Japanese carmakers, Western manufacturers do not rely on suppliers 
associations, although they also have supplier quality development (SQD) departments, hold 
quality contests, and rely on supplier ratings to improve the quality of supplies. For example, 
Auto Alliance, a joint venture of Ford and Mazda, uses QOS and APQP4 to enhance the 
                                                  
4 Toyota Motor Thailand (1992: 22), TCC-A History of the First 10 Years 
4 A Quality Operation System (QOS) helps to increase the competitiveness of a firm by 
generating continuous improvement via strategic goals based on the organizational mission, 
customer expectations and competitive benchmarks.   
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Quality Award to encourage suppliers to continually improve. Similarly, GM employs a 
“16-step global supplier quality improvement process” designed to help suppliers understand 
GM’s business procedures around the world and to work toward continuous improvements. 
 
4.2.2. The Western Subcontracting System in Thailand 
The four major features of subcontracting systems used by Western manufacturers in 
Thailand are the use of market mechanisms, international standards, and global sourcing, 
and little investment in local auto-parts firms. First, Western assemblers prefer to use market 
mechanisms and international standards to control supplier performance. Western 
assemblers, for example, have spun off former affiliates to establish these as independent 
suppliers: Delphi Automotive became independent of GM in June 1999, while Visteon now 
also is independent of Ford. 
Second, Western assemblers introduced QS9000, ISO/TS16949 standards to Thailand. 
Such international standards benefited both assemblers and suppliers by reducing waste and 
inventories, increasing customer satisfaction, and injecting robust management and control. 
The leading parts suppliers of Western assemblers such as Delphi, in turn, require their 
suppliers to meet QS9000 standards and participate in SPDPs (Supplier Performance 
Development Programs. This trend pushes auto-parts suppliers in Thailand to meet Western 
standards.  
In addition, international standards also play an important role in the global sourcing 
strategies of Western assemblers. Uniform standards of production allow assemblers 
                                                                                                                                                            
  Advanced Product Quality Planning (APQP) is a cross-functional approach to ensure that the 
quality of products will satisfy customers. 
 
  16flexibility in procuring parts globally. Using global sourcing, assemblers gain greater 
negotiating power, achieve lower procurement costs and benefit from economies of scale. 
Compared to Western assemblers and component suppliers, who progressively use internet 
links to procure and supply parts globally, Japanese automobile manufacturers are still 
lagging behind. Japanese electronic interchange data systems such as Commerce at Light 
Speed (CALS), jointly developed by Toyota and the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI, now the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, METI), are still more 
expensive than Western systems (Paopongsakorn, 2003).   
Regarding investments in local auto-parts suppliers, Western assemblers have been 
less aggressive than their Japanese counterparts. Only their former affiliated suppliers such 
as Delphi and Visteon have invested in Thai suppliers. In fact, GM, for example, tries to 
utilize suppliers that also supply Japanese assemblers in Thailand as part of its “zero tooling 
policy,” avoiding investing in suppliers’ moulds, dies and machinery. In fact, 89 percent of 
GM’s suppliers also supply parts to Isuzu. In addition, as part of its global sourcing policy, GM 
imports parts such as engines, transmission parts and air conditioners from Europe and 
Japan, with such imports accounting for 43 percent of total parts procurements (Chareonporn, 
2001).  
The fact that Western assemblers have not aggressively invested in Thai auto-parts 
manufacturers can be explained as follows. First, there were already plenty of 
Japanese-affiliated suppliers with satisfactory technological capabilities when Western 
assemblers entered the market. This situation contrasts with that of Japanese automobile 
manufacturers, who entered Thailand at a time when there were only a small number of local 
suppliers. In addition, by the time that Auto Alliance and GM entered Thailand, local content 
regulations, which had impelled Japanese assemblers to invest in and transfer technology to 
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assemblers have been able to flexibly purchase necessary parts from the global market 
without limiting themselves to local suppliers. Finally, due to Western assemblers’ relatively 
small scale of production in Thailand5 it is not worthwhile for them to invest in suppliers of 
specific parts such as engines, which require high levels of technology and large amounts of 
investment.  
 
4.2.3. A Comparisons of Japanese and Western Subcontracting Systems 
Both Japanese and Western assemblers show a high concern for the quality of 
suppliers. They typically select reputable auto-parts firms and always push their suppliers to 
improve quality levels and to innovate by relying on supplier development departments, cost 
reduction schedules and quality contests. However, the method of selection and the ways that 
Japanese and Western assemblers deal with their suppliers are quite different.   
First of all, Japanese assemblers usually test an auto-parts firm by awarding a small 
order for a preliminary assessment while Western assemblers typically rely on global 
standards such as QS9000 as a requirement. Second, Japanese assemblers commonly develop 
close long-term relationships and provide support with regard to both financial and technical 
aspects, which is rarely the case for Western assemblers. In addition, the supplier associations 
set up by Japanese makers arrange a variety of activities that do not directly improve parts 
quality but are aimed at creating unity and/or a good rapport among suppliers and assemblers. 
In other words, the methods that Japanese assemblers rely on to control their suppliers are 
more informal compared to those of Western assemblers. Turning to the scale of production of 
auto-parts suppliers, Western firms usually take advantage of economies of scale generated 
                                                  
5 For example, in 2002, GM’s production capacity in Thailand was only 40,000 vehicles per 
year compared with Toyota’s capacity of 240,000 vehicles per year. 
  18from the production of standardized products for the global market while Japanese suppliers, 
who are typically affiliated with a keiretsu, usually produce specialized parts on a small scale 
meeting the particular needs of assemblers (Kasuga et al., 2003). Finally, Western assemblers 
tend to rely on formal and explicit written contractual agreements, whereas Japanese 
assemblers typically pay attention to past performance and relationships. 
In sum, Western assemblers typically use market mechanisms and depend on global 
standards while Japanese assemblers tend to rely on close and informal relationships when 
dealing with suppliers. 
 
 
5. Theoretical Framework, Model and Data Sources 
 
  Section 6 below will analyze the criteria based on which assemblers choose their 
suppliers. This section introduces agglomeration theory and Williamson’s (1985) transaction 
cost theory, which will be used as the conceptual framework to analyze the clustering of 
production in the Thai automotive industry and in examining assemblers’ supplier selection 
behavior.  
 
5.1 Theoretical Framework 
5.1.1 Agglomeration Theory 
Agglomeration theory tries to explain what factors contribute to the formation of 
industrial clusters by focusing on externalities. Agglomeration theory suggests that the 
formation of clusters is determined by the interaction of positive externalities resulting from 
localization and urbanization economies 6 and the negative externalities resulting from 
                                                  
6 The concept of localization economies refers to the benefits arising from the clustering of 
  19competition and transportation costs. 
According to Marshall (1890), economies of agglomeration provide positive 
externalities through four major channels: 
(1) mass production or internal economies; 
(2) the availability of specialized input services; 
(3) the formation of a highly specialized labor force and the creation of new ideas, both based 
on the accumulation of human capital and face-to-face communication; provided that firms 
own different types of information, the benefits of communication generally increase as the 
number of firms rises; the quality of information is also better the smaller the distance and 
the number of intermediates between trading partners; 
(4) the existence of a modern infrastructure. 
Additionally, Marshall argues that these externalities not only play a role in 
agglomeration formation, but also in generating something like a lock-in effect. 
Manufacturers tend to concentrate where there is a large market in order to benefit from 
spillovers and economies of scale, but the market will be large where manufacturers are 
concentrated. This circular causation process then leads to a snowball effect by which 
industrial firms are locked in in the same region for an extended period. Hence, when an 
industry has been located in a particular location, it is likely to remain there for an extended 
period (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999). 
Proximity between firms is another significant factor. Proximity contributes to 
agglomeration economies by reducing transportation costs and facilitates information 
exchange, learning, and “standing on shoulder” effects.7 According to search models, the costs 
                                                                                                                                                            
firms in the same or related industries, whereas the concept of urbanization economies relates 
to the advantages associated with the overall level of activity prevailing in a particular area. 
7 The “standing on shoulders” effect refers to the fact that new knowledge is often based on 
previous established knowledge. 
  20of obtaining desired goods or services decreases as a result of the reduction in transportation 
and information gathering costs provided by a cluster. Therefore, agglomeration economies 
will raise firms’ sales when they are concentrated rather than isolated. Thus, it is likely that 
the market size will increase as several firms are located together and the bigger market size 
will eventually bring a greater concentration of firms.   
 
5.1.2 Transaction Cost Theory   
  Transaction cost theory, going back to Williamson’s (1985) work, argues that there are 
costs involved in using the market mechanism, and the magnitude of such “transaction costs” 
depends on bounded rationality, opportunism, uncertainty, and asset specificity. 
Williamson (1985) suggests that humans have bounded rationality and can act 
opportunistically. Bounded rationality occurs because economic agents can access only a 
limited amount of information and only have limited capacity for information processing, 
while opportunism arises because some economic agents will make an effort to mislead others 
or conceal information in order to maximize their own profit. Information gathering and 
processing as well as costs arising from opportunistic behavior or attempts to curtail it are all 
transaction costs.   
Uncertainty is another factor giving rise to transaction costs. Williamson (1985) 
considers two forms of uncertainty: internal or behavioral uncertainty and external or 
environmental uncertainty. The former concerns the conduct of transaction partners and the 
possibility of opportunism whereas the latter relates to the contingencies that may arise as 
the transaction proceeds. In making a contract, behavioral uncertainty is reduced when firms 
have a long-term relationship or recurrent transactions. 
 
  21Asset specificity refers to the degree to which durable human or physical assets are 
locked into a particular trading relationship, and hence the value of specialized assets will be 
lower if the contract is terminated. Transaction-specific assets make it costly to switch to a 
new partner. Williamson identifies three types of asset specificity: site specificity, human 




In order to examine empirically which of the factors suggested by theory plays a 
significant role in automobile manufacturers’ selection of a particular supplier as a 
subcontractor, a binary response model, the logit model, is used. Based on the logistic 
probability density function, the logit model makes the relationship between a probability (Pi) 
and independent variables (X) non-linear, thus allowing the probability value to lie between 0 
and 1. In the context of the supplier selection behavior of automobile manufacturers, the logit 
model can be applied as follows: 
Assume  yi*  is the unobservable net benefits that an assembler will obtain by 
selecting a parts manufacturer. If yi*>0, then the assembler will purchase parts from the 
auto-parts firm in question symbolized by y=1. If yi*<=0 then the assembler will select 
another auto-parts manufacturer as its supplier, i.e., y=0. The relationship can be 
summarized in the following equations: 
    yi* is an unobservable but        yi=1 if      yi* > 0 
             y i =0 if      yi* <= 0 
                                                  
8 For further detail see Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), Long, J. Scott and Freese (2001) and 
Cramer (2003) 
 
  22In addition, unobservable net benefits are influenced by a group of explanatory variables (X) 
and a random disturbance, ui, which is uncorrelated with the regressors: 
   y i* = β1 + βx2i +…+ βxki + ui   
Thus, Pr (yi =1) = Pr ( yi*>0) = Pr (ui >-β1 - βx2i -…- βxki) 
  = 1- F (-β1 -βx2i -…- βxki)          where F is the cumulative function of ui (1) 
  = F (β1 + βx2i +…+ βxki)                                            ( 2 )  
Here,  ui is assumed to be distributed logistically. Due to the symmetric and zero mean 
properties of the logistic distribution, equation (1) is equal to equation (2). 
The cumulative distribution function for a logistic random variable is denoted by: 
 F  (ui) = eu/ (1+eu) 
Therefore, Pr (yi=1) = exp(β1 + βx2i +…+ βxki)/ [ 1+exp(β1 + βx2i +…+ βxki)] 
          P r ( yi=0) = 1- Pr(yi=1)  
  = 1/ [1+ exp(β1 + βx2i +…+ βxki)] 
Thus, the odds or Pr(yi =1)/ Pr(yi =0) = exp(β1 + βx2i +…+ βxki)  
 ln(Pr(yi =1)/Pr(yi =0)) = β1 + βx2i +…+ βxki 
Alternatively, the natural log of the odds or logit is a linear function of X, the explanatory 
variables. We can understand the effects of explanatory variables on the probability of being 
subcontracted by computing the marginal effect. 
  The marginal effect in the logit model or the increased probability of being chosen as 
a subcontractor, Pr(yi=1), as a result of a unit change in xji is 




  23Description of Variables 
Explanatory variables used in the paper are selected based on the theories explained 
above and the availability of data. The description of dependent and explanatory variables 
used is as follows: 
1. Dependent variable: the Transaction dummy, which takes either 0 or 1. If a transaction 
between an assembler and a supplier occurs, the value of this variable will be 1; otherwise, it 
will be 0. The number of all possible transactions between suppliers and assemblers can be 
calculated by multiplying the number of suppliers by the number of assemblers. This paper 
uses data from 162 suppliers who supply parts to 14 automobile assemblers and 4 motorcycle 
assemblers. Therefore, in the full model the number of observations will be 2916 (=162*18). 
2. The Distance variable represents the distance between the districts in which the assembly 
plant and the supplier are located. Distance is measured in kilometers based on information 
from the Department of Highways, Thailand. In the case of Toyota, whose assembly plants are 
located in both Chachoengsao and Samut Prakan Provinces, and some suppliers whose plants 
are located in more than one district, the distance variable will be calculated by using an 
averaging method of the various distances between such firms and their trading partners.   
3. ln(labor) is the natural logarithm of the number of employees in each supplier company. The 
ln(labor) variable is introduced in the models as a proxy for economies of scale. In order to 
alleviate problems associated with the fact that the distribution of labor is typically skewed, 
the natural logarithm is used. 
4. An ISO dummy is used to proxy the technology level of suppliers. This dummy will be 1 if 
the supplier is certified with any of the following: QS9000, ISO9001, ISO9002, or ISO14001; it 
will be 0 if the supplier does not have any of these certifications. 
 
  245. Location dummies are a group of dummies that represent the locations of suppliers, such as 
Rayong, Samut Prakan etc. For example, the Rayong dummy will be 1 if the supplier in 
question has its factory in Rayong. As agglomeration theory suggests that markets are likely 
to grow where firms are concentrated, these location dummies are introduced to capture this 
agglomeration effect. To avoid multicollinearity, the paper did not include the dummy for 
Bangkok Province; in other words, the paper regards Bangkok Province as the base category. 
Thus, the marginal effects of the location dummies will represent the location advantages of 
other locations over Bangkok. It is hypothesized that the dummies for Samut Prakan and 
Chachoengsao Provinces take a positive coefficient while provinces where only a small cluster 
of firms exists, such as Prachinburi Province, will have a negative or insignificant coefficient.   
6. Same-nationality dummy: if the major shareholders of an assembler and a supplier are of 
the same nationality, the same-nationality dummy will be 1 regardless of the nationality of 
the assembler and the supplier. However, to examine this effect in more detail, the 
same-nationality dummies for the three major nationalities of assemblers in Thailand are also 
included: the “same nationality (Japanese)” dummy, the “same nationality (Thai)” dummy and 
the “same nationality (American)” dummy. In the case that both the assembler and the 
supplier are Japanese, the “same nationality (Japanese)” dummy will be 1. Similarly, the 
“same nationality (Thai)” and “same nationality (American)” dummies will be 1 if the 
assembler and supplier in question both are Thai and American, respectively. 
In this paper, the nationality of a firm is determined based on the nationality of the 
majority shareholder (50 percent or more) of the firm in question. If two shareholders of 
different nationalities each hold 50 percent of the shares, the firm will be considered to have 
two nationalities.   
 
  25Hypotheses in the Logit Models 
  Next, this section will explain the hypotheses underlying this study in greater detail. 
 
1.  The nearer a parts maker is to an assembly plant, the more likely it is to be chosen as a 
subcontractor.  
Assemblers will benefit from proximity to their suppliers in several ways. First of all, 
proximity facilitates face-to-face communication, reinforces cooperation in design 
processes, and thus improves the quality of products and the relationships between the 
two firms. Second, proximity benefits suppliers, which ultimately benefits assemblers as 
well. For example, proximity generates external spillovers such as technology transfer 
within the region and lowers the transportation costs of suppliers, thus benefiting 
assemblers through lower price and a higher quality of products. Third, proximity to 
assemblers also helps suppliers to meet just-in-time requirements. Thus, it is expected 
that the effect of distance on the probability of a firm to be chosen as a subcontractor will 
be negative. 
 
2.  A firm with a large scale of production and/or possessing high technological capabilities is 
more likely to be chosen as a subcontractor. 
This is because a firm with a large scale of production and/or high technological 
capabilities is more likely to attain economies of scale and be more specialized. In short, 
this hypothesis accounts for the heterogeneity of technology levels and scales of production 
among auto-parts firms that will affect the likelihood that a firm will be chosen as a 
subcontractor. 
 
  263.  If the major shareholder of the assembler and the supplier are of the same nationality, it is 
more likely that transactions between them will occur. 
Based on transaction cost theory, we would expect a supplier to be more likely to be 
chosen as a subcontractor, the lower the degree of behavioral uncertainty involved. 
Behavioral uncertainty is likely to be reduced when the assembler and the supplier are of 
the same nationality because of the shared business culture which facilitates a mutual 
understanding of business practices. 
 
4.  Japanese firms are more likely to conduct transactions with each other than firms of other 
nationalities. 
Several studies have found that Japanese firms usually bring their own suppliers to 
countries where they set up assembly factories. Such suppliers  typically provide 
specialized components and assemblers have long-term relations with them, bringing 
greater transactional certainty (Hackett and Srinivasan, 1998). Therefore, we would 
assume Japanese firms to deal largely with other Japanese firms. This will be tested by 
examining the effect of the “same nationality (Japanese)” dummy compared with the effect 
of the other same nationality dummies.   
 
5.  Since the components of motorcycles and automobiles have different characteristics, there 
are likely to be differences in the criteria for supplier selection of these two types of 
assemblers. 
Since motorcycle and automobile components differ in various ways, it may be 
suspected that other factors, such as investment amounts, technology levels, and the 
production level at which scale economies are reached, may all be different. Therefore, the 
  27criteria that automobile and motorcycle assemblers consider in selecting subcontractors 
may also differ. For example, due to the relatively low value of motorcycle parts compared 
to automobile parts, the amount invested by motorcycle parts makers to reach an efficient 
level of production likely is lower than in the case of automobile parts. Thus, motorcycle 
assemblers are likely to choose components makers that have a lower level of investment 
than automobile assemblers. This hypothesis will be examined by running two separate 
regressions, one using the data for motorcycle assemblers, and one using the data for 
automobile assemblers, and then comparing the results.   
 
5.3 Data Sources 
  Most of the data are obtained from the Thailand Automotive Industry Directory 
2003-2004, which is published by the five most important authorities in the Thai automotive 
industry: (1) the Thai Automotive Institute, (2) the Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturer Association, 
(3) the Thai Automotive Industry Association, (4) the Automotive Club, Federation of Thai 
Industries, and (5) the Auto-Parts Industry Club, Federation of Thai Industries. These data 
are complemented by data from company websites and financial statements obtained from the 
Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. Distance data between districts is obtained from the 
Department of Highways, Thailand. Basic descriptive statistics of the sample data are shown 
in Table 8. 
 




  28Model Description 
To examine the determinants of supplier selection, we run logit models to examine 
the effects of distance, economies of scale, the level of suppliers’ technology, and nationality. 
The regressions are run for the automotive industry as a whole, for Japanese assemblers only, 
for American assemblers only, for automobile assemblers only, and for motorcycle assemblers 
only, to discover commonalities and differences between these groups.   
The hypotheses will be tested using three different models. Model 1 aims at testing 
the effects of transportation costs, economies of scale, and suppliers’ technology level by 
controlling for the effect of same nationality. Since the nationalities of assemblers vary from 
case to case, the dummy variables capturing the same-nationality effect in the respective 
models are different. In the estimation for the industry as a whole and for automobile 
assemblers only, the “same nationality” dummy is employed, while in the estimation for the 
Japanese assemblers only and the American assemblers only, the “same nationality 
(Japanese)” and “same nationality (American)” dummies respectively are employed to control 
for the effect of same nationality with the assemblers. Regarding the case of motorcycle 
assemblers, where all the major shareholders are Japanese, the same-nationality effect, thus, 
is measured by the “same nationality (Japanese)” dummy. 
In contrast with Model 1, Model 2 focuses on a comparison of the effects of same 
nationality of the main assemblers (Japanese, American and Thai) in detail; i.e., Model 2 
compares the effect of the “same nationality (Japanese)” dummy, the “same nationality 
(American)” dummy and the “same nationality (Thai)” dummy in order to test hypothesis 4. 
However, since there is only one nationality in the regressions using data of Japanese 
assemblers only, of American assemblers only, and of motorcycle assemblers only, a 
comparison of the same nationality effects cannot be conducted. Thus, Model 2 cannot be 
  29applied in the case of Japanese assemblers only, American assemblers only, and motorcycle 
assemblers only. 
Lastly, Model 3 concentrates on supplier location advantages and uses Bangkok as 
the base category. The estimates of all location dummies in Model 3, therefore, can be 
interpreted as the comparative advantages of suppliers in those locations over those of 
suppliers in Bangkok.   
 
 
6. Results and Interpretation 
The results for Model 1 are shown in Table 9. The results for Model 1 generally 
suggest that the likelihood of being chosen as a subcontractor increases if suppliers have a 
large scale of production. On the other hand, same nationality appears to have a negative or 
insignificant effect, which may be a surprising result. However, if we take into account that 
the Thai automotive market is relatively small compared to that of Japan or the US, 
supplying parts to as many assemblers as possible would be advantageous both to suppliers 
and assemblers as it allows the exploitation of economies of scale to reduce unit costs. In 
addition, since several assemblers, such as Toyota, have recently made Thailand a platform 
for exports, the quality of parts has become more important. Thus, subcontracting with 
competent suppliers, even if they are of a different nationality, would be preferable. Finally, 
although the distance variable and the ISO dummy display the expected signs, they are 
generally statistically insignificant in Model 1. 
Examining the effects of same nationality in detail in Model 2 (see Table 10), we find 
that the negative effect of same nationality in Model 1 is largely the result of the negative 
effect of the “same nationality (Thai)” dummy. A possible explanation for the negative effect of 
  30the “same nationality (Thai)” dummy is Thai suppliers’ insufficient R&D effort and their 
inability to attain international quality standards, an interpretation which is supported by 
the significant positive estimate for the ISO dummy in the automobile assembler case and in 
the survey by the Thai Automotive Institute (2002). The study found that small Thai parts 
manufacturers had difficulties attaining ISO or QS9000 certification and had low 
management and design abilities.   
Table 11 shows the results for Model 3, which examines location advantages and uses 
Bangkok as the base category. Therefore, the estimates of all location dummies in Model 3 can 
be interpreted as the comparative advantage of suppliers in those locations over suppliers in 
Bangkok. The results suggest that suppliers in Chachoengsao, Chon Buri, Pathum Thai and 
Samut Prakan Provinces are more likely to be chosen as subcontractors than those in 
Bangkok. This result holds both for the industry as a whole and for Japanese assemblers only. 
It should be noted that Japanese assembly plants are located in all of those provinces. 
As for the comparison of Japanese and American assemblers, the results from both 
models are similar in that the ln(labor) variable is positive and significant, which means that 
the larger a supplier’s scale of production, the more likely it is to be chosen as a subcontractor 
by assemblers from either country.   
Next, Table 12 compares the results of the models for automobile and motorcycle 
assemblers. The results for the two are similar in that for both types of assemblers, the scale 
of production is importance but whether the supplier is of the same nationality is not. On the 
other hand, the results differ in that automobile assemblers value suppliers’ level of 
technology, while motorcycle assemblers do not: the estimates for the ISO dummies are 
positive and significant in the models for the automobile assemblers, but insignificant (and 
negative) in the models for the motorcycle assemblers. It should also be noted that the 
  31estimates for the ISO dummies are higher than those for the ln(labor) variables in the case of 
automobile assemblers. This suggests that although automobile assemblers regard suppliers’ 
scale of production as an important factor, they place greater importance on the technology 
level. 
Regarding the significance of the models, the likelihood ratio test for overall 
significance is used. The p-values of all models are shown at the bottom of the tables. The 
results show that all models except Model 3 for the case of American assemblers are 
statistically significant. The p-values of all models, except for that one case, are lower than 
0.07. 
Finally, the ln(labor) variable is positive and significant in all models except the one 
model that is insignificant. Thus, the findings indicate that a large scale of production raises 
the likelihood that an auto-parts maker is chosen as a subcontractor. 
 
Insert Tables 9-12 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
  This paper examined the determinants of supplier selection in the Thai auto industry, 
considering the role of transaction costs, economies of scale, nationality and the location of 
parts suppliers. In addition, the role of these factors for different types of assemblers – 
Japanese and American, automobile and motorcycle – were compared.   
The findings suggest that parts makers’ scale of production is a dominant factor in 
supplier selection while there is no significant preference for suppliers of the same nationality 
as the assembler. Concerning the role of location, it is found that all location dummies that are 
  32positive and significant are dummies for provinces where assembly plants are located. This 
suggests that parts makers are more likely to be chosen for subcontracting when they are 
located in the same province as the assembler. In terms of the theoretical considerations above, 
this result confirms that transportation costs and agglomeration economies play a role.   
Next, it is found that the “same nationality” dummy has a significant negative effect 
in the case of Thai firms, which is probably the result of Thai suppliers’ insufficient R&D and 
the inability to attain international quality standards. The Thai government therefore should 
devise policies to support and promote R&D by local firms. Finally, the government should 
enact policies for developing the automobile industry by taking the situation of the Thai 
auto-parts industry into account because of the extensive connection between the two 
industries. 
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Source: Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers Association, “Trends and Developments in Thailand’s Auto Market.” Online, < 
www.thaiautoparts.or.th/fileupload/AutomotiveHistory.ppt>. 
  37 Figure 2: Location of Automotive Assemblers 
Bangkok
-B a n g c h a nG e n e r a l  
Assembly
- Y.M.C. Assembly
-T h a i  H o n d a  
Manufacturing
Samutprakarn
- Toyota Motor Thailand
-I s u z u  M o t o r s  ( T h a i l a n d )
- Siam Nissan Automobile
- Thai Yamaha Motor
- Thai Swedish Assembly
- Hino Motors (Thailand)









Thai Rung Union Car
Rayong
- Auto Alliance (Thailand)
-G e n e r a l  M o t o r s  
(Thailand)
- BMW Manufacturing 
(Thailand)
-K a w a s a k i  M o t o r s  
Enterprise (Thailand)
Chachoengsao
- Toyota Motor Thailand




Source: Thai Automotive Institute (2002). 
  38Figure 3: Location of Automotive Parts Makers 
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  40Table 1: The Production Capacity of Vehicle Manufacturers in Thailand, 2002. 
Production 
No. Car  Assemblers  Brands  Location 
Nationality 
of parent 
firm  capacity* 
1  Auto Alliance (Thailand) Co., Ltd.  Ford & Mazda  Rayong  U.S.  135,000   
2  Banchan General Assembly Co., Ltd.  Chrysler  Bangkok  Thai  20,000   
3  BMW Manufacturing (Thailand) Co., Ltd.  BMW  Rayong  German  10,000   
4  General Motors (Thailand) Co., Ltd.  GM  Rayong  U.S.  40,000   
5  Hino Motors (Thailand) Co., Ltd.  Hino  Samut Prakan  Japanese  28,800   
6  Honda Automobile (Thailand) Co., Ltd  Honda(Cars)  Ayutthaya  Japanese  60,000   
7  Isuzu Motors (Thailand) Co., Ltd.  Isuzu  Chachoengsao& Samut Prakan  Japanese  180,000   
8  MMC Sittipol Co., Ltd.  Mitsubishi  Bangkok & Chon Buri  Japanese  190,200   
9  Siam Nissan Automobile Co., Ltd.  Nissan  Samut Prakan  Japanese  124,000   
10  Thai Rung Union Car Public Co., Ltd.  Thai Rung and for 
Isuzu and Nissan 
Bangkok Thai  9,600   
11  Thai-Swedish Assembly Co., Ltd.    Volvo  Samut Prakan  Swedish  6,000   
12  Thonburi Automotive Assembly Plant Co., Ltd.  Mercedes Benz  Samut Prakan  Thai  18,100   
13  Toyota Motor Thailand Co., Ltd.  Toyota  Chachoengsao & Samut Prakan  Japanese  240,000   
14  YMC Assembly Co., Ltd.  Volkswagen, Audi, 
Peugeot 
Bangkok Thai  12,000   
Total             1,073,700   
          
Production 
No. Motorcycles  Assemblers  Brand  Location 
Nationality 
of parent 
firm  Capacity* 
1  Thai Honda Manufacturing Co., Ltd.  Honda (Motorcycles)  Bangkok  Japanese  850,000   
2  Thai Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.  Suzuki  Pathum Thani  Japanese  550,000   
3  Thai Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd.  Yamaha  Samut Prakan  Japanese  420,000   
4  Kawasaki Motors Enterprise (Thailand) Co., Ltd.  Kawasaki  Rayong  Japanese  200,000   
5  International Vehicles Co., Ltd.    Cagiva  Samut Prakan   -  60,000 
Total             2,080,000   
Source: Office of Industrial Economics, Ministry of Industry, online: <www.oie.go.th> 
Note:   1. International Vehicles Co., Ltd. is a small motorcycle manufacturer in Thailand. Its transaction data is not available, thus 
the company is not included in the empirical analysis.
  41 Table 2: First-Tier Suppliers, Categorized by Parts Functions 















1. Engine parts 20 32% 8 13% 35 56% 63
2. Electrical parts 15 29% 10 19% 27 52% 52
3. Drive, Transmission
& Steering parts
17 33% 6 12% 29 56% 52
4. Suspension &
Brake parts
13 37% 1 3% 21 60% 35
5. Body parts 57 48% 17 14% 45 38% 119
6. Accessories 18 46% 2 5% 19 49% 39
7. Molds & Dies 8 36% 1 5% 13 59% 22
Total 1-7 148 39% 45 12% 189 49% 382
8. Other 206 63% 23 7% 98 30% 327
Total 1-8 354 50% 68 9% 287 41% 709
 
Source: The National Economic and Social Development Board, Master Plan for the Thai 
Automotive Industry 2002-2006, online: <www.nesdb.go.th>. 
Note: There are a total of 709 suppliers that supply parts and materials directly to OEMs (386 














Table 3: Car Production in Thailand (Number of 
Units) 
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350,857 218,336 119,986 240,369 294,834 289,349 382,297 468,938 588,979 283,287 373,348 31.8%
OPVs  2,544 1,604 1,950 5,822 5,960 4,621 20,559 8,965 4,910 -  -  - 




6.2% -35.5% -56.1%  106.9% 25.8% 11.6% 27.3% 28.3% 23.7%          
     
Notes:    1.      In 2004 (Jan.–Jun), passenger cars include OPVs due to a change in the           
       exercise  taxes  system. 
        2.  OPVs  stands  for  off-road  purpose  vehicle. 
 
 
Table 4: Car Sales in Thailand, 1996-2005 (Number of Units) 
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172,730  132,060 46,300 66,858 83,106 104,502 126,353 179,005 209,110  101,508 90,818 -10.5%
Commercial 
vehicles 








327,663 188,324  81,263 129,904 151,703 168,639 241,266 309,114 368,911 174,767 230,788 32.1%
Other  12,585 8,481 4,275 7,199 7,649 6,370 21,620 16,492 11,967 5,933 3,147 -47.0%
Total  589,126 363,156 146,207 218,330 262,189 297,052 409,362 533,176 626,026 298,704 345,897 15.8%
Percentage 
change 
3.1% -38.4% -59.7%  49.3%  20.1% 13.3% 37.8% 30.3% 17.4%       
 
Source: Thai Automotive Institute, online:   
< http://www.thaiauto.or.th/Records/Records_Main.asp>. 
Note: 1 ton pick-up trucks in Jan-Jun 2004 and Jan-Jun 2005 include PPV (Pick-Up   
     Passenger  Vehicle). 
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Table 5: Car Exports, 1996-2005 (Number of Units) 
Percen
tage 
    2004 2005
   























104.3% 281.5%  73.3% 113.7% 38.2% 165.7% -23.3% 84.6% 8.0%      
Source: Thai Automotive Institute, online: 




    Table 6: Production of Motorcycles, 1996-2005 (Number of Units)     
2004  2005  Perce
ntage









Family 1,265,434  982,012 563,570  810,920 1,089,476 1,145,001 1,903,302 2,368,272 2,787,136  1,396,344 1,128,519 -19.2%
Sport 172,360 99,032  36,927  35,506 36,247 64,994 73,842 56,406 80,159  45,789 50,924 11.2%
Total  1,437,794   1,081,044   600,497   846,426   1,125,723  1,209,995 1,977,144  2,424,678 2,867,295    1,442,133 1,179,443 -18.2%
         
Source: Thai Automotive Institute, online: 
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Table 7: Thailand’s Major Auto-Parts Exports, 1996-2005 (Million Baht) 
             
                        
Type of 
parts 
1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2004  2005 
Percent
age 









1,536.8 3,731.8  7,106.2 8,309.8 6,094.1 5,376.4 4,316.1  1,985.7  3,951.5 99.0%
Spare 
parts 
215.4 505.3 495.3 883.4 1,245.7 1,758.6 1,789.6 2,152.6 2,909.4  1,312.7  1,804.7 37.5%
Jigs & 
dies  43.66 56.3 63.7  141.4  120 141.2 145.3 312.5 797.5 254.9 203.7 -20.1%
OEM 
parts 










Other 5.33  27.6  25.9  58.5  336.7 96.7 150.1 604.1 920.7  590.3  1,554.2 163.3%














Table 8: Basic Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Data 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  Unit 
distance_1  71.89  44.08 0 236.15  Kilometers 
trans  0.19  0.39 0 1  - 
asset  202.16  247.79 1 1500   Million baht 
labor  364.23  506.30 12 4800  Persons 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
 Result Tables 
  Table 9: Model 1   
 
Whole Industry  Japanese Assemblers  American Assemblers 
Variables 
Marginal Effect  z  P>|z|  Marginal Effect  z  P>|z| Marginal Effect  z  P>|z|
Distance  -0.0003      -1.47 0.143 -0.0001      -0.4 0.686 -0.00001    -0.04 0.97
ln(labor)  0.0387  *** 4.25 0 0.0442  ***  3.71 0 0.0278  *  1.75 0.08
ISO Dummy  0.0369      1.49 0.137 0.0157      0.48 0.634 0.0605    1.46 0.144
Same Nationality Dummy  -0.0464  *** -2.62 0.009                        
Same Nationality  
       (J apanes e)  Dum my 
                -0.0097      -0.39 0.696              
Same Nationality 
       (Am erican)  Dum m y 
                                0.2431  ** 2.39 0.017
Same Nationality  
       (Thai ) Dum m y 
                                  
A y u t t h a y a                                     
C h a c h o e n g s a o                                     
C h o n   B u r i                                     
N a k h o n   P a t h o m                                     
Pathum Thani                                               
R a y o n g                                     
R a t c h a b u r i                                     
Saraburi                                               
Samut Prakan                                               
Samut Sakhon                                               
                                     
Number of Observations  2241          1491              500           
Log Likelihood  -1069.87          -746.139           -204.567           
P-value of Chi-Square  0.000           0.0014              0.0121           
Note: *** Significant at the 1%-level, ** significant at the 5%-level, * significant at the 10%-level. 
         N / A :   D r o p p e d   d u e   t o   c o l l i n e a r i t y .  Table 10: Model 2 
 
  Whole Industry  Automobile Assemblers 
Variables 
Marginal Effect  z  P>|z| Marginal Effect 
 
  Z  P>|z|
Distance  -0.00055  *** -3.13 0.002 -0.00062  ***
 
  -3.12 0.002
ln(labor)  0.03884  *** 4.42 0 0.03738  ***   3.75 0
ISO Dummy  0.03197      1.35 0.177 0.04951  *    1.94 0.053
S a m e   N a t i o n a l i t y   D u m m y                          
  Same Nationality  
       (J apanes e) Dum m y 
0.06490  **  2.47 0.014 0.14912  *** 4.05 0  
  Same Nationality 
       (Am erican)  Dum m y 
0.10948      1.15 0.252 0.12256      1.1 0.271
  Same Nationality  
       (Thai ) Dum m y 
-0.15007  *** -9.9 0 -0.15949  ***   -9.64 0
A y u t t h a y a                   
 
     
C h a c h o e n g s a o                    
 
     
C h o n   B u r i                  
 
     
N a k h o n   P a t h o m                  
 
       
P a t h u m   T h a n i                          
R a y o n g                          
R a t c h a b u r i                          
S a r a b u r i                          
S a m u t   P r a k a n                          
Samut Sakhon                                 
                           
Number of Observations  2241             1741              
Log Likelihood  -1037.678              -797.621     
 
       
P-value of Chi-Square  0.000              0.000  
 
       
 
Note: *** Significant at the 1%-level, ** significant at the 5%-level, * significant at the 10%-level. 
         N / A :   D r o p p e d   d u e   t o   c o l l i n e a r i t y .  
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Model 2 is not applicable because there are only assemblers of one nationality in the model sample range. Table 11: Model 3 
 
Whole Industry  Japanese Assemblers  American Assemblers 
Variables 
Marginal Effect  z  P>|z| Marginal Effect  Z  P>|z| Marginal Effect  z  z |   P > |
Distance  -0.0002      -0.94 0.345 -0.0002      -0.52 0.603 0.00014    0.38 0.703 
ln(labor)  0.0279  *** 2.82 0.005 0.0283  **  2.21 0.027 0.02014    1.21 0.228 
ISO Dummy  0.0306      1.2 0.231 0.0116      0.34 0.732 0.06800  *  1.71 0.087 
S a m e   N a t i o n a l i t y   D u m m y                                     
Same Nationality  
       (J apanes e) Dum m y 
                                  
Same Nationality 
       (Am erican)  Dum m y 
                                  
Same Nationality  
       (Thai ) Dum m y 
                                  
Ayutthaya  0.0722      1.38 0.169 0.1080      1.56 0.119 -0.04169    -0.52 0.601 
Chachoengsao  0.1025  **  2.15 0.031 0.1041  *  1.71 0.087 0.11905    1.27 0.203 
Chon Buri  0.0905  *** 2.82 0.005 0.1352  *** 3.2 0.001 -0.02662    -0.51 0.612 
Nakhon Pathom  -0.0991      -1.22 0.221 -0.0602      -0.48 0.632 N/A           
Pathum Thani  0.0887  *  1.82 0.068 0.1591  **  2.43 0.015 -0.06564    -1.07 0.284 
Rayong  0.0465      1.22 0.221 0.0411      0.8 0.425 0.09272    1.21 0.227 
Ratchaburi  -0.0094      -0.11 0.916 -0.0615      -0.63 0.532 0.08805    0.37 0.71 
Saraburi  0.0289      0.26 0.792 0.1346      0.86 0.391 N/A           
Samut Prakan  0.0631  **  2.48 0.013 0.0866  *** 2.64 0.008 0.00224    0.05 0.96 
Samut Sakhon  0.0524      1.03 0.303 0.0665      1.01 0.311 -0.02924    -0.39 0.697 
                                     
Number of Observations  2241             1491             492          
Log Likelihood  -1064.8853             -735.843             -203.763          
P-value of Chi-Square  0.0003             0.0009             0.385          
Note: *** Significant at the 1%-level, ** significant at the 5%-level, * significant at the 10%-level. 
         N / A :   D r o p p e d   d u e   t o   c o l l i n e a r i t y .
  48 Table 12: Comparison of Automobile and Motorcycle Assemblers 
Model 1  Model 3 













z  P>|z| 
Distance  -0.00022      -1.04 0.296 -0.00043    -1.04  0.299 -0.0001    -0.42 0.676 -0.0004     -1.03  0.303 
ln(labor)  0.03663  *** N3.52 0 0.04484  ** 2.37  0.018 0.0253  ** 2.22 0.027 0.0381  *  1.94  0.052 
ISO Dummy  0.05812  **  2.15 0.031 -0.0328    -0.55  0.585 0.0553  ** 2 0.045 -0.0624     -0.98  0.328 
Same Nationality Dummy  -0.03993  *  -1.94 0.052                                            
Same Nationality  
       (J apanes e)  Dum my 
                -0.0625  *  -1.67  0.095                              
Same Nationality 
       (Am erican)  Dum m y 
                                             
Same Nationality  
       (Thai ) Dum m y 
                                             
Ayutthaya                                -0.0047    -0.09 0.929 0.4070  *** 3.18  0.001 
Chachoengsao                                0.1298  ** 2.42 0.015 -0.0503      -0.56  0.579 
Chon Buri                                0.0496    1.47 0.141 0.2626  *** 3.16  0.002 
Nakhon Pathom                                -0.0937    -1.04 0.298 N/A             
Pathum Thani                                0.0262    0.5 0.614 0.3500  *** 3.01  0.003 
Rayong                                0.0134    0.34 0.735 0.2026  *  1.86  0.063 
Ratchaburi                                -0.0057    -0.06 0.953 N/A             
Saraburi                                0.0473    0.39 0.699 N/A             
Samut Prakan                                0.0435    1.58 0.114 0.1505  **  2.36  0.018 
Samut Sakhon                                0.0842    1.45 0.147 N/A             
                                                
Number of Observations  1741          488           1741           464            
Log Likelihood  -840.517          -225.602           -836.772            -206.638        
P-value of Chi-Square  0.000           0.0247           0.0035           0.0007          
Note: *** Significant at the 1%-level, ** significant at the 5%-level, * significant at the 10%-level. 
         N / A :   D r o p p e d   d u e   t o   c o l l i n e a r i t y .  
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